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Abstract
Today’s air traffic control system has reached a limit to the number of aircraft that can be safely managed at
the same time. This air traffic capacity bottleneck is a critical problem along the path to modernization for air
transportation. The design of the next separation assurance system to address this problem is a cornerstone
of air traffic management research today. This report reviews recent work by NASA and others in the areas
of function allocation and en route separation assurance. This includes: separation assurance algorithms and
technology prototypes; concepts of operations and designs for advanced separation assurance systems; and
specific investigations into air-ground and human-automation function allocation.
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Nomenclature
AAC Advanced Airspace Concept
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast
AFR Autonomous Flight Rules
ANSP air navigation service provider
AOC airline operations center
ATC air traffic control
ATM air traffic management
CD conflict detection
CD&R conflict detection and resolution
CDTI cockpit display of traffic information
CP conflict prevention
CR conflict resolution
CTAS Center-TRACON Automation System
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
HITL human in the loop
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
LOS loss of separation
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NextGen Next Generation Air Transportation System
NLR Netherlands Aerospace Centre
RTA required time of arrival
TFM traffic flow management
TRACON Terminal Radar Approach Control
UAS unmanned aircraft system
URET User Request Evaluation Tool
WDA Work Domain Analysis
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1 Introduction
Separation assurance is one of the original air navigation services since the early days of air transportation.
Today, this service is provided to aircraft operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) by an international
network of air traffic controllers who use a variety of procedures and technology to monitor aircraft and
relay critical instructions to pilots during flight. These actions ensure that aircraft remain separated at safe
distances in order to mitigate the risk of mid-air collision.
This system provides separation assurance and other services necessary to maintain the safe, orderly,
and expeditious flow of air traffic today. However, this system is reaching a limit to the number of aircraft
that can be safely managed simultaneously, presenting a bottleneck for international plans to modernize and
accommodate future growth in demand for air travel [1].
A new paradigm for providing separation assurance is needed in order to enable significant advances in
air traffic capacity and efficiency while preserving the hard-won safety record of today’s system. The ques-
tion of this new paradigm is important now more than ever to ongoing efforts such as the FAA’s Next Gen-
eration Air Transportation System (NextGen) [2] and the Single European Sky ATM Research project [3].
The next evolution (or revolution) in separation assurance remains an unsolved problem, and its solution
will shape the course of air transportation and its impact on the global economy in the coming decades.
Although there are a number of approaches to the design of the next separation assurance system, this
report is motivated from the perspective of function allocation. Function allocation, for the purposes of
this report, is concerned with all of the necessary functions comprising a separation assurance system, as
well as how those functions should be allocated to the various human operators and automation systems
participating in air traffic operations on the ground and in the air.
This separation assurance system design problem and its formulation in terms of function allocation
is one of the core problems in air traffic management (ATM) research. All paths to modernization must
somehow address this problem and resolve the air traffic control capacity bottleneck of today’s operations.
This question has been the subject of much research at NASA and elsewhere, and although much has been
learned to date, it is still unclear what the future of separation assurance should look like.
The purpose of this report is twofold. First, this report will give an introduction to separation assur-
ance and function allocation in order to define the problem and its key research issues. Second, the report
will summarize the history of research and development into separation assurance and function allocation
by NASA and others over the last 20 years, including: separation assurance algorithms and technology
prototypes; concepts of operations and designs for advanced separation assurance systems; and specific in-
vestigations into function allocation in particular. This review and discussion is intended to inform decisions
about future R&D investment in separation assurance and related technologies.
1.1 Background
In today’s air traffic operations, the aircrew are generally not responsible for separation under IFR. This
limitation is driven by a number of practical and technological constraints on the flight deck. The first
constraint is the lack of adequate surveillance of other aircraft. Under instrument meteorological conditions
and at transonic speeds, the aircrew cannot be relied upon to visually see other aircraft at the distances
necessary to detect and respond to upcoming conflicts. Also, until recent advances such as Automatic
Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) in the last decade, civilian aircraft have not been equipped to
reliably observe other aircraft electronically. Second, even when surveillance is available on the flight deck,
pilots are generally not trained to solve complex traffic problems in high-density airspace without assistance.
The limitations that have historically prevented pilots from assuming responsibility for separation have
at the same time driven the development of air traffic control (ATC). Today, air traffic controllers provide
separation services using traffic displays and a variety of procedures to monitor aircraft and relay critical
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instructions to pilots via radio voice communication. Although this arrangement is responsible in part for
the remote risk of mid-air collision today, it is a mentally demanding and notoriously stressful task for
the controller [4]. The existing controller workforce has been pushed to its practical limits, leading to
a “workload bottleneck” impeding significant growth in commercial air traffic as well as the burgeoning
demand to operate unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in the same airspace.
This bottleneck is a core problem of ATM research, and all plans to modernize the airspace must address
this problem in some way. Many solutions have been proposed, each involving some combination of new
technology and procedures, with varying impact on the current operational paradigm.
One approach to the workload bottleneck problem recognizes the air traffic controller’s workload satu-
ration and proposes to alleviate it by introducing a variety of automation tools to perform or assist with part
of the work. If the controller’s efficiency can be improved through automated support of some of the sep-
aration assurance functions, then presumably the entire airspace system can accommodate more air traffic
without compromising safety. For instance, perhaps the lower-level task of monitoring traffic for conflicts
could be automated, freeing the controller’s attention to higher-level decision making and strategic planning
tasks. Eventually, as automation technology becomes more and more sophisticated, consider the possibility
of a fully automated air traffic control system accommodating great numbers of aircraft, where humans no
longer routinely participate in the inner control loops but instead act on the outer loops as automation system
managers.
A parallel approach seeks to reduce the controller’s workload by transferring some of the separation
functions to the flight deck under certain circumstances. If each aircraft can share some of the overall sep-
aration assurance workload, then this may lend to the scalability of the overall airspace system in response
to growing air traffic. For example, a controller may delegate a certain conflict to be resolved by the aircrew
of a specific aircraft using the surveillance equipment and automation tools on board, thereby offloading
some of the controller’s workload for that encounter. In the limit, aircrews operating under new procedures
with sufficiently advanced technology on board might take full responsibility for their own separation and
manage traffic conflicts autonomously without assistance from ATC. This concept is known as airborne self
separation.
There are many alternatives between the span of these two approaches. A number of concepts involve
the dynamic allocation of functions that shift between agents depending on the situation. In others, decisions
are made through an iterative process of negotiation between agents, and thus not made by any single agent
alone. In such a system, it becomes more difficult (and perhaps less important) to a priori define exactly
who will perform what function at a given time. Regardless, it is clear that there are a multitude of paths to
consider in the evolution of separation assurance in the future.
Many of these approaches have been investigated by NASA and others through the development and
evaluation of specific technology prototypes and concepts of operation at varying levels of detail. These
“point designs” have offered a great deal of knowledge and experience regarding the feasibility and promise
of many advanced separation assurance concepts. At the same time, there is a need to understand the trade
space between the points in order to skillfully distinguish between them, and to make broader recommenda-
tions for R&D investment. Hence, the motivation for the function allocation approach.
In this context, the purpose of function allocation is to determine how the functions comprising a sepa-
ration assurance system should be performed and who should be responsible for performing them. Specif-
ically, the “how” intends to answer which functions should be performed on board the aircraft vs. in a
ground-based facility. The “who” refers to what agent should be responsible for performing these functions,
whether a human operator or an automation system.
Each question has wide-ranging implications across the domains of airspace design; communication,
navigation, and surveillance infrastructure; decision support automation and human-systems integration;
and economic cost and benefit. The potential impacts go beyond the number of aircraft that can be safely
accommodated in the sky at any one time; they extend to other potential benefits to the global economy
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realized by changing the way aircraft are operated in the airspace. The far-ranging, multidisciplinary nature
of the problem makes it challenging to study and presents difficulty in the search for a simple, single answer
to the question.
There is a sense that despite the tremendous amount of research behind future separation assurance
systems and other ATM areas, the progress towards real-world implementation of any advanced solution has
stalled in recent years. In 2014, a report from the FAA Inspector General [5] found that key requirements
for NextGen had yet to be defined, among them the “division of air-ground responsibility” and the “level of
automation” for separation assurance. Hence, this is an appropriate time to examine the research that has
been done to date and attempt to identify critical work moving forward that might address the barriers to
growth and change in the current system.
1.2 Scope
The scope of this report mirrors the scope of NASA’s recent research activity into function allocation for
separation assurance. This report is focused on separation assurance systems that are realizable in a notional
2025–2035 time period. This will be referred to as the mid-term period. The mid-term encompasses sep-
aration assurance systems that rely on more advanced automation and automatic exchange of information
between the aircrew, operators, and the air navigation service provider than is possible with the air traffic
operations and infrastructure of today. In this period, humans generally remain in the decision-making loop,
although they may be supported by a significant amount of automation in performing lower-level tasks. At
the end of the mid-term period, automation systems may be allocated control of some critical decision-
making tasks under certain conditions, e.g., in low-density, en route airspace.
The mid-term period is contrasted with the near-term period (2015–2025), which is characterized by
incremental and more-limited advancements to today’s air traffic management systems. The mid-term is
also contrasted with the far-term period (2035+), which may be characterized by much more advanced and
pervasive automation technology and increasingly autonomous systems. The mid-term does not extend to
the fully-autonomous concepts of the far-term period, where human operators may only be peripherally
involved in the operation or not at all.
This report is focused on the evolution of commercial, scheduled IFR operations, which comprise the
majority of passenger and cargo traffic today. However, also of interest is the flexibility of mid-term separa-
tion assurance systems to accommodate a variety of other airspace users, including general aviation, military
operations, and emerging unmanned applications. In particular, any proposed separation assurance system
architecture must be designed to operate with full functionality in the presence of potentially high numbers
of unmanned vehicles.
This report is focused on en route operations outside of the terminal area. This includes the climb,
cruise, and descent phases of flight that occur during normal transport operations. However, many interfaces
between this phase and the rest of the flight are also relevant, e.g., the importance of coordination between
en route separation assurance with arrival management functions [6].
This report is focused on separation from air traffic rather than the avoidance of severe weather, terrain,
etc. While not the primary focus, these additional hazard avoidance functions will be discussed where they
have a significant interaction with air traffic separation. Short-term traffic collision avoidance, while sharing
similarities with separation assurance, is not in scope.
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2 Problem Definition
2.1 High-Level Agents in Air Traffic Operations
The term agent is used in this report to loosely denote any person or socio-technical system capable of taking
an active role in air traffic operations and carrying out one or more functions associated with separation
assurance. In this context, we are concerned with those agents who could be said to bear the responsibility
for performing the given function. This notion of responsibility serves to distinguish between people or
technology with whom the responsibility, authority, and accountability for performing the function actually
lie, versus agents that merely provide assistance or support in the performance of the function.
Today, the air navigation service provider (ANSP) is a complex network of ground-based agents respon-
sible for the overall management of air traffic in a given geographic region. The ANSP typically provides
separation assurance and other navigation services to aircraft while also performing other large-scale traffic
management functions necessary for the operation of the entire airspace. Included under the umbrella of the
ANSP are the air traffic controllers who are responsible for providing separation assurance to IFR aircraft.
The ANSP also plays a primary role in managing contingency situations arising in a local or system-wide
scenario. The ANSP as a whole has good information about the overall state of operations throughout
the airspace system. However, it has comparatively poor information about the detailed state of any given
aircraft and has limited knowledge of the business objectives of any given flight operator.
The flight deck system is comprised of the aircrew and the supporting technology on board a given
aircraft. Today, the aircrew are responsible for reviewing and complying with instructions from the ANSP
whenever possible, but are generally not responsible for separation. However, the aircrew are ultimately
responsible for the safety of flight and have the final authority regarding trajectory of their own aircraft.
They have high-quality knowledge about the state of their own aircraft and their operational intentions.
They also have fair information about the immediate environment (e.g., nearby weather, terrain). Although
the aircrew may have some surveillance on surrounding traffic, they usually have very limited knowledge
about the intentions of this traffic. The aircrew have comparatively poor information about the regional
and airspace-wide state of air traffic operations, the ANSP’s traffic management objectives, and the activity
throughout the rest of the flight operator’s fleet.
The flight deck and the ANSP are the two principal agents of separation assurance today. However,
there is growing interest in the role of the airline operations center (AOC) (or flight operations center) in
the separation assurance domain. The AOC is responsible for managing daily flight operations of a given
airline or aircraft operator. In today’s system, the AOC is concerned with the conformance of flights to a
variety of federal regulatory and safety requirements, the optimization of business operations and logistics,
as well as recovery from off-nominal events such as severe weather or security issues. Although the AOC
plays a significant role in the trajectory management of a given flight, this report will focus on the primary
separation assurance relationship between the ANSP and the flight deck.
2.2 Separation Assurance Functions
2.2.1 Primary functions
A separation assurance system performs the functions necessary to ensure that aircraft remain at safe dis-
tances from other traffic during flight. In today’s system, this safe distance is referred to as a separation
standard. An event in which two aircraft pass closer than the separation standard distance (unless operat-
ing under special conditions, e.g., visual separation) is referred to as a loss of separation (LOS). A conflict
occurs when a loss of separation is predicted to occur in the future with some degree of certainty. While a
conflict can also exist between three or more aircraft simultaneously, this report will focus on two-aircraft
conflicts in discussion.
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An agent performing conflict detection (CD) uses the available air traffic surveillance data, flight plans
and trajectory intent information, vehicle performance models, and winds aloft in order to detect conflicts
within a given airspace and time frame. CD relies on the function of trajectory prediction in order to accu-
rately detect conflicts. Given that such a system will always operate in the presence of uncertain information,
the CD function must deal with the fundamental sensitivity trade-off between false and missed detections.
There may be other related sub-functions included as a part of CD, i.e., the prioritization of conflicts by
urgency, and the decision to alert another agent to take an action in response to a conflict.
In response to a given conflict, some agent must perform conflict resolution (CR) in order to resolve the
conflict and maintain separation. This is an optimization and decision-making problem, posed as follows.
Choose a lateral, vertical, or speed change maneuver, or a combination of those, to be taken by the aircrew
of one or both aircraft, such that the two aircraft will no longer be in conflict after the maneuvers have been
executed. The chosen maneuvers should be within the nominal performance envelope of the aircrew and
the aircraft and should minimize the operational impact of the change to each flight. The resolution should
not create any new conflicts with additional aircraft or otherwise worsen the situation. The CR function to
generate the resolution maneuver is distinct from the function that executes the maneuver and physically
changes the aircraft’s trajectory, although they may be performed by the same agent.
Conflict detection and resolution, commonly styled together as CD&R, form the foundation for separa-
tion assurance. Closely related to CD&R is conflict prevention (CP). Whereas CD&R is a reactive function
performed in response to conflicts that occur (“pop up”) during flight, CP is a proactive function that en-
compasses a variety of actions taken to prevent conflicts from occurring in the first place. For example, if
the aircrew intends to execute a climb maneuver in order to reach a more fuel optimal cruise altitude, this
maneuver should be checked (“probed”) for conflicts before it is executed. If the proposed climb has a con-
flict, then an alternative maneuver should be taken in order to achieve a similar objective without creating a
new conflict.
Separation assurance forms one safety layer in an overall system intended to mitigate the risk of mid-air
collision. Collision avoidance is another layer of this system. Whereas separation assurance operates on
distances and times on the orders of miles and minutes, collision avoidance is measured in feet and seconds.
Whereas a loss of separation is a significant but nonetheless routine event during everyday operations, a
collision avoidance event is a serious and potentially life-threatening occurrence. It is the purpose of a
separation assurance system to maintain separation and provide a comfortable margin such that aircraft
never enter the realm of collision avoidance. While similar in principle to separation assurance, collision
avoidance is a separate area of research and is outside the scope of this report.
2.2.2 Relationship to other ATM functions
While this report is concerned with separation assurance, the interface between separation assurance and
the rest of the ATM system is complex, and it is not always clear where the boundary should be drawn.
The agent performing the functions to maintain separation from traffic is typically also concerned with a
number of other ATM functions to be considered simultaneously. The following related functions fall under
the broad umbrella of trajectory management.
Separation assurance is closely related to a set of analogous functions for separation from other hazards
and restrictions, such as severe weather, terrain, and special use airspace. These hazards must be detected
and avoided in the same manner as the CD&R functions for traffic, and it is often the case that all of these
factors should be taken into account simultaneously. For instance, when making trajectory decisions about
an aircraft in response to a traffic conflict, the presence of severe weather in the area will restrict the space of
safe maneuvers available for conflict resolution. Thus the weather problem must be taken into consideration
when solving the traffic problem, and vice-versa.
There may be other trajectory constraints that should be considered when performing separation assur-
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ance, such as those imposed by a traffic flow management (TFM) system. For example, if the aircrew has a
required time of arrival (RTA) to achieve at a given location, then trajectory changes made to resolve traffic
conflicts may affect the ability of the aircraft to meet this constraint. Other examples of TFM constraints that
may impact separation assurance functions are miles-in-trail and sector capacity restrictions. Thus, an agent
performing separation assurance may be concerned with meeting multiple constraints at the same time.
In addition to the satisfaction of operational constraints, separation assurance also has an impact on the
overall optimization and efficiency of a given flight. Any given maneuver, whether it is lateral, vertical,
or speed change, will have some affect on the fuel economy of the flight, be it positive or negative, large
or small. An efficiency-minded aircraft operator will be interested in making the most optimal trajectory
changes during flight, and thus the metrics of efficiency and the performance of separation assurance func-
tions are tied to one another.
Given the number of different agents involved in separation assurance and other air traffic management
functions associated with a given flight, coordination is important for ensuring that all of these agents work
well together. Coordination itself can be considered a function. For instance, a controller may coordinate
with controllers in downstream sectors regarding changes to a given aircraft’s flight plan in response to a
traffic conflict; or, the aircrew may coordinate a re-route with both the AOC and the ANSP in response to
emerging weather detected by onboard radar. The degree to which the various agents act in a coordinated
way and the manner in which this coordination is accomplished is important for separation assurance.
2.3 Function Allocation
The term function allocation originated in the human-machine systems research discipline. In that context,
function allocation is a core activity concerned with the assignment of functions and tasks between the
human operators and machine elements of a given system. While it has been applied across virtually the
entire spectrum of human-machine systems, perhaps the earliest application of function allocation was by
coincidence to the problem of air traffic control [7].
For the purposes of this report and the NASA research referenced here, the definition of function allo-
cation is somewhat augmented from its traditional sense. First, the reference to machines is taken to mean
automated or autonomous functions executed by computer software. Second, this human-automation axis
is complemented by the air-ground axis, wherein special attention is paid not only to whether a function
is assigned to a human or automation agent, but also to whether that agent resides on the flight deck or in
a ground-based facility. Thus, the interest is not only in changes brought about by increasing the level of
automation of today’s separation assurance system, but also those that result from the changes in the roles
and responsibilities of the air and the ground in separation assurance operations.
In the abstract, the function allocation for separation assurance problem can be posed as follows. Con-
sider all of the necessary functions comprising a separation assurance system as well as all of the potential
ground-based/airborne/human/automation agents that could perform them. The combination of these func-
tions with all of their possible assignments to agents forms a space of alternative separation assurance system
architectures. It is then desirable to understand the trade-offs between these alternatives and to form rec-
ommendations about which architectures are superior on the basis of metrics such as performance, safety,
efficiency, cost, etc. This may be viewed as an analytical trade space exploration problem, with multiple
design factors, external constraints, and objective functions.
2.3.1 Air-ground axis
The air-ground axis refers to whether a function is performed by an agent on board the aircraft or in a
ground-based facility. This implies a question of locus of control or responsibility, i.e., whether the function
is performed in a centralized manner on the ground by few (or one) agents vs. distributed to a larger number
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of agents on board many aircraft. This in turn relates to a question of coordination: are the centrally-made
decisions of the one agent better coordinated and more optimal than the decisions of many distributed agents
each acting individually?
Further, is the locus of control static and unchanging throughout the operation? Or could it change
dynamically depending on the situation? What is the relationship between the responsibility of the air and
the ground during normal operations compared with off-nominal and emergency conditions? Is the one
agent suited to be the backup for the other?
The air-ground axis and its questions of locus of control and coordination capture the dichotomy be-
tween the two most significant paradigms in separation assurance that have been proposed: i) ground-based
separation and ii) airborne self separation. While there are a plethora of variations on these themes, these
two represent the primary competing philosophies behind the majority of separation assurance research to
date.
2.3.2 Human-automation axis
The human-automation axis refers to whether a function is performed by a human operator or by an automa-
tion system. This is the traditional sense of function allocation in the human factors discipline. The axis
represents a range of human-automation team configurations. On one end, a human operator performs the
function with minimal or no automated support. In the middle, the human performs the function with vary-
ing degrees of automation assistance. At the other end, a shift occurs where an automation system performs
the function with diminishing human involvement or oversight. This description by levels of automation is
broadly used in many fields [8].
Along this axis lie all of the traditional problems of human-systems integration. Which level of automa-
tion is appropriate to a given function? What is the most appropriate allocation given the natural strengths
and weaknesses of human beings and computer algorithms? How does one design a team in which hu-
mans and automation work well together to jointly solve a problem? How can the interface and procedures
be designed in order to establish trust between the human operator and the automation system? In what
configurations are humans and automation systems more effective together than either alone?
Further, there is an issue of automation system reliability and the human response to automation failures.
If there is an intent to introduce automation in order to increase the number of aircraft in the airspace, what
happens when the automation fails? Can the human managers take over in a crisis situation, particularly if
they no longer exercise those skills in daily operations? Can an automation system be designed to perform
the complex functions of separation assurance in a highly robust, reliable, and certifiable way, to prevent
such a disaster from occurring?
Both the advanced ground-based and airborne separation assurance approaches will require some form
of automation support for the human operator, and thus all of the traditional questions along the human-
automation axis are of great importance to the problem at hand.
2.3.3 System metrics
The comparison between candidate architectures requires a set of metrics on which to make an evaluation.
This section discusses the major categories of metrics for consideration.
As the purpose of a separation assurance system is to ensure that aircraft remain at safe distances in
order to mitigate the risk of mid-air collision, safety is a critical metric. Here, safety can be described in
terms of the reliability of the system and its effectiveness in maintaining separation of traffic during normal
operations and during disturbances. In general, advancements to aviation systems have the requirement to
maintain or increase the safety of operations while meeting other performance goals.
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At a simplified level, a measure such as the probability of loss of separation (e.g., per flight hour) can be
used here. Other safety-related metrics include conflict detection accuracy (in terms of the rates of missed
alerts and false alarms) and the amount of warning time necessary to detect and resolve a given conflict.
Additionally, for some airborne distributed separation assurance architectures, there is concern over issues
such as the “domino effect,” wherein the uncoordinated resolution of one conflict may lead to the repeated
creation of additional conflicts with other aircraft. If such an effect propagates without bound, it could lead
to widespread disruptions to air traffic operations, which is a highly undesirable outcome. Thus, the stability
of the system and its ability to resist and recover from disturbances, internal and external, are also important
safety metrics.
There are also a number of other human factors metrics that are essential to the safety and feasibility of
an architecture. The most basic one relates to workload, in that the frequency and difficulty of tasks assigned
to human operators must be within the operator’s functional capability. As the separation assurance problem
is motivated by the existing workload pressure on today’s controller workforce, it is important to ensure
that the workload induced by a candidate separation assurance architecture on any human operator, pilot
or controller, is reasonable and ideally no greater than today. There are a number of other human factors
concerns that relate to the nature of the functions being performed as well as the human-human and human-
automation interactions required by the architecture, which must be considered.
After safety, the next purpose of a separation assurance system is to provide air traffic capacity to the
airspace. The most basic measure of en route capacity is the number of aircraft that can safely be accom-
modated in a given airspace at a given time. Increases in capacity can be achieved by reducing the standard
separation distance between aircraft as well as changes to the workload of the human operators to allow
them to manage more aircraft at any given time. En route capacity is also related to other ATM capacity
restrictions, such as the spacing between aircraft in the terminal area, as well as the safe arrival rate of air-
craft at the airport runway. Related to capacity is the scalability of the system to meet projected demand for
future air traffic.
While the number of aircraft is an important metric of system performance, the operational efficiency
of those flights is also significant. For any given aircraft flight, there is an idealized, optimal trajectory
that would be flown if there were no other aircraft in the sky, and it is a separation assurance system goal to
minimize the deviation of each flight from this optimum. This trajectory efficiency can be measured in terms
of the difference in fuel consumption or flying time of the actual flight compared with the ideal. In other
terms, the system should maximize the flexibility of each aircraft operator to realize its business objectives
through minimal impact to the user-preferred trajectory for each flight.
The metrics of trajectory efficiency are directly related to a set of economic metrics described in terms
of costs and benefits. Costs include the cost of developing, implementing, and operating a given separation
assurance architecture, e.g.: research, development, and certification; one-time and recurring costs asso-
ciated with fixed infrastructure and aircraft equipage; operational costs associated with fuel consumption,
flying time, and schedule delays; and workforce-related costs associated with training and daily operations.
Benefits include the value of the system derived by various stakeholders, such as: taxpayers; regulators;
service providers; aircraft and equipment manufacturers; and passengers and other users.
The goal of the separation assurance system is then to maximize the net economic value compared to
today’s operations. Another part of this value is in the accommodation of new and increasingly autonomous
uses of the airspace, e.g., UAS of all types, on demand air travel and personal air vehicles, as well as civil
supersonic flight and commercial space access.
Finally, there are a number of social, political, and institutional challenges or barriers to realizing any
significant change to today’s separation assurance system. Thus, an important metric is in the acceptability
of a given architecture to all stakeholders, which is a slow and difficult thing to achieve in practice. Beyond
the technical merit and theoretical value of a given architecture, these other concerns can be grouped under
the umbrella of “implementability.”
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3 Separation Assurance Automation
Much research into the problem of separation assurance has focused on the development of software al-
gorithms for conflict detection and resolution as a key enabler for automated separation assurance. This
includes algorithms intended for both ground-based and airborne separation applications. Reference [9] is
a comprehensive survey of algorithms and modeling methods, highlighting many of the design and imple-
mentation issues to be encountered in a practical CD&R system.
3.1 Conflict Detection
A conflict detection system relies on trajectory prediction (a.k.a. state propagation) to predict an aircraft’s
future path and detect future losses of separation. A CD system can be classified by the nature of this
trajectory prediction. The simplest systems employ a linear projection of the current position and velocity
of the aircraft, assuming the aircraft continues in a straight line at constant velocity into the near future [10].
This state-based approach is adequate for many short-term CD applications (less than 1 minute to LOS),
but is unusable for long-term prediction. As the time horizon for prediction is pushed further into the
future, variations in the aircraft’s velocity, along with environmental uncertainty such as wind cause the
state projection to become unreliable for the detection of conflicts.
To improve the long-range accuracy of conflict detection, a trajectory predictor can also incorporate
information about an aircraft’s trajectory intent [11]. Trajectory intent consists of information such as the
flight plan and clearances as managed by the ANSP, as well as the more detailed horizontal and vertical
path contained in an aircraft’s flight management system. By using this information, a CD algorithm may
incorporate the planned changes in course, speed, and altitude for more accurate predictions. Using intent
information can improve the reliability of CD in today’s operational environment to about 30 minutes from
LOS. Beyond this limit, the variation in the along-track position due to wind uncertainty limits the accuracy
of en route CD.
The amount of surveillance and intent information required for conflict detection is important especially
for airborne self separation concepts. Whereas today’s ground-based separation assurance system relies on
surveillance radar and a flight plan management system along with the air traffic controller’s situation aware-
ness to perform conflict detection, the same information is not yet widely deployed to the flight deck. While
NextGen solutions such as ADS-B and System-Wide Information Management may provide access to this
information on the flight deck, each new requirement comes at a cost to the ANSP and the aircraft operator.
Thus, there has been a great deal of research in identifying the impacts of varying levels of surveillance and
intent information on trajectory prediction performance, and ultimately the impact to conflict detection and
resolution [12–14].
Where reliable intent information is not available, solutions such as intent inference have been pro-
posed [15]. Intent inference proposes to infer the trajectory intent of an aircraft from information about
its current state and immediate environment. For example, even if an aircraft’s full trajectory intent is not
known, it can safely be assumed that the aircrew will not usually elect to fly into an oncoming weather cell
or restricted airspace. Further, in today’s operational environment, aircraft typically fly between a set of
fixed, named waypoints, and thus one might anticipate an aircraft’s route based on what waypoint it appears
to be flying directly towards. The immediate maneuver of an aircraft can also be estimated from state data
measurements, such as the detection of an in-progress turn maneuver [16]. Intent inference is particularly
applicable to the problem of conformance monitoring, facilitating the early detection of a maneuver that
deviates from an aircraft’s previously indicated trajectory.
A CD algorithm may also be classified by whether it uses a single, nominal trajectory for detection or
whether it represents uncertainty using a range of possible future trajectories. In the nominal approach, a
trajectory predictor produces a single “best guess” for the trajectory of each aircraft for CD. While this is
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straightforward to implement, the use of a nominal trajectory alone does not represent the uncertainty in this
prediction and may lead to missed detections.
One approach to incorporating uncertainty into CD is the use of geometric prediction buffers around
the nominal trajectory, in which a CD algorithm uses the intersection of two buffered trajectory regions
to form the basis for detection [17]. More sophisticated approaches use probabilistic modeling, Monte
Carlo sampling, and other techniques to produce a distribution of future trajectories. A probabilistic conflict
detector then uses these trajectory distributions to form a probability of loss of separation as the basis for
alerting [18].
3.2 Conflict Resolution
A conflict resolution algorithm may be described by the type of resolution maneuvers it generates. A tactical
resolver [19,20] is one that generates simple heading, altitude, or speed changes to be executed immediately
for the purposes of resolving a short-term conflict (less than 5 minutes to LOS). A tactical resolver is typi-
cally designed around a straightforward algorithm to minimize the complexity of implementation, in order
to act as a reliable safety layer to ensure that separation is maintained.
In contrast to a tactical resolver that is focused only on the immediate avoidance of traffic, a strategic
resolver [21, 22] is more concerned with the long-term optimization of the flight in addition to separation
assurance. A strategic CR algorithm may offer resolutions in the form of flight plan changes that maintain
separation while simultaneously optimizing the path for fuel and time. The algorithm may also work to
satisfy TFM constraints, such as the conformance with an RTA at a specified fix, and the avoidance of
weather hazards and special use airspace. Strategic conflict resolution, along with these other trajectory
optimizations, are commonly grouped together under the umbrella of trajectory management.
A strategic CD&R system may be coupled with an independent tactical system as a safety-critical backup
to form a layered solution for separation assurance. However, the use of separate algorithms in this arrange-
ment presents an interoperability problem. In practical experience, two algorithms that work well inde-
pendently may exhibit undesirable behavior when coupled together [23]. For instance, executing the clear
resolution from a strategic, intent-based system may trigger a false conflict alert from the tactical, state-based
backup, since the tactical system does not incorporate the intent information used by the strategic system.
Thus, it can pose design challenges when the two systems disagree during operation. It is not always clear
how to harmonize two such systems while maintaining their independence for the purposes of redundancy.
While this report has heretofore discussed CD and CR as two separate steps in a discrete process, there
is yet another class of approaches that attempt to solve the separation problem as a continuous control opti-
mization. In [24], aircraft conflicts are resolved by an analogy to the repulsion of charged particles. In this
approach, aircraft receive continuous control actions derived from a fictitious force of repulsion that ensures
the aircraft avoid each other with minimal deviation from the ideal path to destination. In such an ap-
proach, an aircraft may continuously make small, automatic trajectory adjustments in order to avoid nearby
traffic while otherwise achieving an optimal trajectory. However, the continuous optimization approach is
appropriate for an automatic flight control algorithm, but is difficult for human pilots and controllers to man-
age without significant automation assistance. Whereas pilots and controllers today routinely share route
changes as a short sequence of named waypoints over voice communication, a complex and continuously
varying 4D trajectory must be exchanged between computer systems via data link.
3.3 Conflict Prevention
While CD&R is traditionally a reactive function that is not engaged until two aircraft enter into a conflict,
the purpose of conflict prevention is to prevent such conflicts from arising in the first place. A CP algorithm
seeks actions to be taken by aircraft at the present time that decrease the likelihood of future conflicts in the
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airspace. The simplest form of conflict prevention is to check that any proposed trajectory change, whether
for purposes of conflict resolution or flight optimization, does not itself create any new conflicts with other
aircraft [25].
A number of CP approaches are related to the management of the complexity of the airspace [26, 27].
Under complexity management, aircraft trajectories are proactively modified to limit such factors as the
number of aircraft in a region of airspace or the frequency of crossing routes and other traffic complica-
tions [28–30]. Similar is the notion of flexibility preservation [31], in which trajectory changes are made
to maximize the space of future maneuver options for a given aircraft. Complexity management and flexi-
bility preservation are both intended to prevent conflicts, reduce overall airspace congestion, and reduce the
intensity of required control actions for any given aircraft.
3.4 Discussion
The foundational work on conflict detection and resolution algorithms for air traffic was focused on proving
the basic feasibility of these systems from a technical standpoint. This body of work has demonstrated that
at a basic level, these functions can be performed by a computer, at least in an idealized laboratory setting.
This work also demonstrated the potential for management of far greater numbers of aircraft than is possible
in today’s system, and with greater route efficiency. While there are innumerable variations that have been
examined, it can be confidently stated that the lowest-level separation assurance functions can be automated
under the right conditions.
However, a number of issues in CD&R automation remain. The first relates to automation reliability
and higher-level decision making. Whereas a state-of-the-art CD&R algorithm might perform well within
the scope of a given traffic encounter at an instant in time, some algorithms exhibit behavior which might
be described as “unstable” when examined over longer periods of time. An algorithm which previously
produced a “turn left” command might suddenly indicate “turn right” in response to a momentary change to
an aircraft’s trajectory. While the algorithm might be technically correct in both responses at each instant,
the behavior is nevertheless “unstable” when compared to the actions of a human controller. While a number
of heuristics can be applied to filter and smooth the output of a CD&R system [32], these patches are no
substitute for the higher-level “big picture” that a human controller applies when managing traffic.
Other operational issues occur at the interface between the separation assurance automation and the
rest of the air traffic operation. For instance, a system may be adequate at detecting and resolving traffic
conflicts and maintaining separation, but these actions may be sub-optimal when considering larger, strategic
traffic management concerns. Consider a CD&R algorithm that insists an aircraft should turn left to avoid a
conflict, whereas a controller or pilot’s preference would be for the aircraft to turn right because of weather,
restricted airspace, etc. If the separation assurance system is isolated from the rest of the overall system,
then it falls to a human operator to somehow resolve the differences. Thus, these algorithms should be aware
of other relevant constraints and attempt to satisfy them simultaneously along with the separation constraint.
The state-of-the-art CD&R algorithms also perform much better when all actors in the system are “well-
behaved.” For instance, simulation results are generally very good when accurate, up-to-date trajectory
information for all aircraft is available to all agents performing CD&R. When accurate trajectory informa-
tion is available to all agents involved, the conflict detection problem is much simplified and the overall
effectiveness of the separation assurance system increases dramatically. However, when an insufficiently
robust algorithm makes incorrect assumptions in an environment where trajectory information is unavail-
able or unreliable, results are generally unacceptable. Thus, either the algorithms must have a sophisticated
treatment of uncertainty in trajectory prediction, along with the operational buffers necessary to account for
this uncertainty, or the overall system must be designed with the necessary infrastructure to provide accurate
trajectory data to each responsible agent.
A basic problem also remains in the formal safety assessment and assurance of any given CD&R al-
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gorithm. Given the open-ended and non-deterministic nature of the separation assurance traffic problem
and software algorithms, it is difficult to apply traditional aviation certification processes. There is also a
mismatch between the greater level of rigor required in the development of airborne avionics compared with
ground-based computer systems. While some progress has been made in the application of formal meth-
ods from the field of computer science [33], they have as yet only been applied to the simplest of CD&R
algorithms.
4 Concepts of Operation and System Architectures
While CD&R algorithms are a key enabler for automated separation assurance, their application to real
world operations requires a more complete system architecture and concept of operations. This section dis-
cusses some of the major paradigms that have been developed to address the separation assurance problem.
4.1 Ground-based separation
Concepts for automation-assisted ground-based separation developed out of the natural course of evolution
of the air traffic control system. In this general paradigm, the separation responsibility between the air traffic
controller and the pilot does not change from today. Rather, the controller is augmented by a growing set
of decision support tools and other automation to allow for the management of greater numbers of aircraft
with fewer required control actions along more efficient routes.
The first such separation assurance automation tool to be widely deployed in the U.S is the User Re-
quest Evaluation Tool (URET), developed by the MITRE Center for Advanced Aviation System Develop-
ment [34]. URET provides a conflict probe that scans for conflicts up to 20 minutes into the future and
allows the controller to check clearances and potential route changes for conflicts before execution. How-
ever, not all of these capabilities are used consistently in practice, and acceptance varies from facility to
facility and from controller to controller [35]. While URET provides some convenient functionality (e.g.,
the replacement of paper flight strips), it has not fundamentally changed the function allocation of separation
assurance in air traffic control.
Another concept for controller automation is the Center-TRACON Automation System (CTAS), devel-
oped at NASA Ames Research Center. CTAS combines a number of automation tools intended to improve
controller productivity, including both strategic and tactical conflict detection and resolution algorithms for
en route separation management [32]. CTAS was extensively evaluated under simulation and field test-
ing [36, 37], demonstrating potential workload and efficiency benefits for controllers and airspace users.
While the en route CD&R components of CTAS are not used operationally, its Traffic Management Ad-
visor [38] has been deployed to all 20 air route traffic control centers in the U.S. CTAS remains an active
research platform used as the foundation for a number of other efforts, such as the Dynamic Weather Routes
system [39].
Work on CTAS later evolved into another effort known as the Advanced Airspace Concept (AAC) [1,40].
Under AAC, the responsibility for primary separation assurance shifts from the human controller to the
automated CD&R system. This system continuously scans for conflicts, and upon detection will generate
an appropriate resolution maneuver and automatically uplinks it to the appropriate aircraft for execution
by the aircrew. By automating the routine monitoring and control tasks, the human controller is free to
devote more time to solving higher-level, strategic traffic management problems, as well as handling off-
nominal situations. This arrangement is intended to dramatically increase the number of aircraft that can be
safely managed in the airspace, beyond the gains that are possible through incremental changes to today’s
system. The AAC concept has been extensively evaluated in fast-time simulation as well as human-in-the-
loop (HITL) experiments [41, 42].
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4.2 Airborne self separation
The general concept of airborne self separation involves the transfer of the primary separation assurance
functions from the ANSP to the flight deck. The pilot, assisted by onboard equipment for surveillance
of nearby traffic, becomes responsible for conflict detection and resolution and other separation assurance
functions. This is analogous to the duty of the pilot to see and avoid other traffic under Visual Flight Rules
in uncontrolled airspace, except that the pilot is enabled to do so in instrument conditions by the onboard
separation assurance technology. The concept of self separation has existed for decades, predating the
technology necessary to make it feasible [43].
The most basic form of this concept provides the pilot with a cockpit display of traffic information
(CDTI) with some conflict alerting functions but no automated conflict resolution support [44–46]. In this
form, the pilot is responsible for creating resolution maneuvers and avoiding traffic without automation
assistance. While HITL studies have shown some basic ability for pilots to avoid traffic with this capability,
it is generally considered that a CDTI and conflict alerting alone are insufficient to allow the aircrew to
reliably perform separation assurance in typical operations with acceptable performance and workload. The
aircrew will require a more comprehensive airborne separation assurance system providing the tools of
conflict resolution and prevention in order to realize a robust system for self separation operations.
One such attempt to provide a complete solution for self separation, called Autonomous Flight Rules
(AFR), has been developed at NASA Langley Research Center [47]. AFR is proposed as a new set of rules
for operations in which the aircrew assume full responsibility for en route separation assurance, provided that
they are equipped with surveillance technology such as ADS-B as well as onboard decision support tools for
CD&R. Since the AFR aircrews are self-managing, it is envisioned that many of the airspace constraints and
traffic flow management initiatives of today’s system will be relaxed, e.g., sector capacity and miles-in-trail
restrictions. The intended benefits of this arrangement are increased flexibility for the operator to realize
the business-optimal trajectory for each flight, as well as providing an alternative implementation path to
ground-based infrastructure deployments. AFR and an associated prototype system for onboard CD&R have
been extensively tested in batch-mode and human-in-the-loop simulations [12, 48–50].
A number of other significant self separation concepts have been developed and tested in Europe. Under
the Mediterranean Free Flight project, the Netherlands Aerospace Centre (NLR) developed and evaluated
a concept for airborne self separation intended for en route operations in low density airspace over the
Mediterranean. This concept and the supporting tools for CD&R were evaluated extensively in Monte Carlo
simulation [51] as well as in a flight trial [52]. Under the iFly project, NLR continued this work to investigate
the limits of airborne self separation in high density airspace [53].
4.3 Mixed operations
While advanced ground-based and airborne separation concepts are presented here as separate paradigms,
a practical view of the mid-term period requires the consideration of mixed equipage operations. In this
period, the system must accommodate newer aircraft equipped to perform advanced, automated separation
assurance operations alongside the legacy fleet of aircraft that are still flying under IFR operations as they
are conducted today. The mid-term period, due to its target time frame, will most likely be one of transition.
The harmonization of self-separating and ground-managed traffic is of particular concern since the sep-
aration responsibility for these distinct operations is divided between different agents (the aircrew and the
ANSP). The concern is that where different aircraft are being controlled by separate and uncoordinated
agents in the same airspace, there is the opportunity for confusion and ambiguity of responsibility, leading
to unresolved conflicts and losses of separation. Clearly, a separation assurance system supporting mixed
operations must have mechanisms to prevent this.
A conceptually simple solution is to segregate self-separating traffic in a different airspace from the
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ground-managed traffic, i.e., a form of procedural separation. Such proposals include restriction of self-
separation operations to certain altitudes, within designated flow corridors, or other geographic areas [54–
56]. While this procedural separation may eliminate some operational concerns, it raises other issues. For
one, if a new self-separation operation is relegated to undesirable airspace, this imposes limitations on the
flexibility and benefit to potential operators, which may invalidate the business case for self separation in the
first place. Thus, airspace segregation may challenge the equitable accessibility of the airspace to all users.
Other concepts propose to integrate self-separating and ground-managed traffic in the same airspace.
One such concept was developed under NASA’s Distributed Air Ground Traffic Management project. In
this concept, AFR aircrews perform self separation in the same airspace as IFR aircraft being managed by
the ANSP. The most important aspect of this concept is the formalization of the responsibility of each agent
to resolve which conflicts through a set of unambiguous priority rules [57]. However, the effectiveness of
this arrangement is limited by the amount of information available to each agent about the intent of the
aircraft managed by the other agents. For instance, if an AFR aircrew is responsible for resolving a conflict
with an IFR aircraft, its ability to do so is affected by whether or not the IFR aircraft’s intent is available
for trajectory prediction and conflict detection. Thus the effectiveness of the mixed operations architecture
is directly linked to the communications and information sharing infrastructure that is available, and in turn
the amount of explicit coordination that is possible between various agents.
4.4 Hybrid air/ground concepts
Whereas ground-based and airborne separation concepts may be seen as opposite extremes along the air-
ground axis, many proposals offer some kind of shared responsibility between controller and pilot. Under
the paradigm of trajectory negotiation [58], the pilot and controller each use a set of decision support tools
to engage in an automatic trajectory optimization process that considers factors such as traffic, weather, and
user preferences to produce a solution that simultaneously satisfies air traffic management constraints while
maximizing the user’s business objectives. In this case, both the ANSP and the aircrew (and the AOC, either
directly or by proxy) participate in the function of conflict resolution, although it is usually said that the
ultimate responsibility for separation assurance remains with the ANSP.
4.5 Discussion
Work to develop CTAS, AAC, and AFR has shown a great deal of promise in both advanced ground-based
separation and airborne self separation, as well as their hybrid and derivative iterations. Basic technical fea-
sibility of all of these concepts has been demonstrated, including basic integration of separation assurance
automation tools and airspace operations and procedures in relevant NextGen/mid-term operational scenar-
ios. This work has also generated preliminary support for the potential operational benefits of increased
airspace capacity and flight efficiency.
Work remains on several fronts. First, as discussed in the previous section, continued maturation of the
separation assurance algorithms for automated conflict detection, resolution, and prevention is needed to
provide robust tools for real-world operations. These prototype separation assurance systems can perform
well in the laboratory under ideal conditions, but more work is needed to understand their behavior in a
wider variety of practical scenarios. Simulation experiments are necessarily limited in the scope and realism
that they can recreate, and field evaluations are very difficult to carry out in practice.
Second, there are many variations on these concepts that perform well in future scenarios but with infras-
tructure and equipage that does not yet exist. For instance, the key enablers of ADS-B and controller-pilot
data link communications have not yet been widely deployed. Nor have the necessary computer upgrades
to support advanced automation tools been installed on the flight deck or in ground-based control facilities.
Without these enablers, it is difficult to make headway on any significant improvement to today’s separa-
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tion assurance system. Thus, work remains to provide further justification for investments in this enabling
infrastructure, including spin-off efforts to provide substantial system benefits in the near-term.
5 Function Allocation
Compared to the wealth of research in separation assurance automation technology and the development of
specific concepts of operation, comparatively little work has been done to compare these systems from the
basis of function allocation.
There are several review papers, covering a variety of separation assurance concepts, that make a qualita-
tive attempt to compare them. Reference [59] compares a set of ground-based, airborne, and mixed concepts
with varying levels of automation on the basis of technological readiness as well as impacts to controller
and pilot situation awareness and workload. Reference [60] performs a similar analysis, classifying prior
work along the air-ground and human-automation axes. Both papers highlight maturity differences among
the range of concepts, pointing to the nearer-term readiness of controller automation tools compared to the
more dramatic paradigm shift of full airborne separation.
5.1 Heuristic Design and Evaluation
Function allocation methods contained in this category generally involve designing or evaluating a function
allocation concept against a set of specific pre-defined criteria. These criteria may take the form of design
guidelines, requirements, or metrics created by experts knowledgeable in the design of function allocation
concepts.
The problem of effectively allocating tasks along the two axes is unique to the primary function of
maintaining separation assurance. However, Ref. [61] provides a high level philosophy for distributing tasks
between humans and varying levels of automation. This features ten levels of automation of decision and
action selection, as well as a simple four stage model of information processing (e.g., sensory processing,
perception and working memory, decision making, and response selection).
Reference [61] recommends the use of evaluative criteria to measure the effectiveness of a given func-
tion allocation construct, along with providing a few suggestions for preferred analysis methods. This leaves
the method by which a function allocation construct is designed and evaluated somewhat open to the inter-
pretation of the individual researcher, depending on the depth or the breadth of the task.
The definition of the function allocation problem is in itself a difficult research task, given the breadth
and depth of the subject. Reference [62] attempts to provide a formal framework for function allocation,
proposing a method to systematically decompose the separation assurance problem into a hierarchy of func-
tions and sub-functions along with a matrix of allocations between these functions and airspace system
agents. Given a matrix of these alternatives, the paper proposes then to systematically evaluate and compare
them through more detailed modeling and analysis.
Relatedly, Ref. [63] outlines the application of Work Domain Analysis (WDA) [64] to the Traffic
Collision Avoidance System. WDA applies an abstraction hierarchy [65] to five conceptual layers ranging
from functional purpose to physical form. The authors also discuss some of the challenges associated with
the application of the abstraction hierarchy to aircraft displays.
Reference [66] outlines requirements for effective function allocation between humans and automation,
including the capability of agents to perform their allocated functions, accounting for other factors such as
teamwork. The paper also proposes metrics for measuring function allocation effectiveness, including mis-
matches between responsibility and authority, stability of the human’s work environment, and the human’s
ability to adapt to context. The paper then provides an example function allocation for transport aircraft
operations during the descent phase of flight.
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Reference [67] calls for a quantitative approach to assessing human judgment during a collision detection
task via the n-system lens model analysis. The n-system lens model (originally inspired by [68]) applies a
quantitative approach to the analysis of human decision making. Applying this type of quantitative analysis
to the tasks of CD&R could provide insight to the informational cues flight crews rely on for decision
making. This information could then be used to form the basis of a more optimal function allocation between
humans and automation in future separation assurance systems.
5.2 Human-in-the-Loop Simulation
Human-in-the-loop (HITL) simulation experiments have been employed to evaluate and compare a variety of
separation assurance architectures [49, 50, 69]. Such experiments typically simulate one or more separation
assurance architectures and evaluate them on the basis of human factors and operational performance metrics
such as workload, number of losses of separation, conflict resolution efficiency, etc. Variations on the AFR
and AAC concepts have been evaluated in a series of HITL experiments conducted jointly by NASA Ames
and Langley, as a way to explore alternative airborne and ground-based allocations of CD&R functions
in the same airspace. HITL experiments have also been used to evaluate the impact of varying levels of
automation support on the workload and effectiveness of the air traffic controller in performing separation
assurance functions compared to the baseline of today’s operations.
Generally, HITL experiments can provide excellent insights into practical human factors issues related
to an operational concept. The experience gained from observing real human operators interacting with
prototype procedures and technology is unmatched by paper analysis or pure computer simulation. However,
HITL experiments can be costly and time-consuming to develop and typically suffer from low sample sizes.
It is also difficult to generalize the results of a HITL that examined one particular procedure or technology
and draw broader conclusions about air/ground or human/automation research questions.
5.3 Computer Simulation
A variety of computer simulations have also been used to study separation assurance from a function al-
location perspective [66, 70, 71]. Agent-based air traffic simulations have been used to evaluate various
centralized and distributed separation assurance architectures. This approach simulates an air traffic sce-
nario with a computer model of the behavior of the agents performing separation assurance, with varying
degrees of fidelity. Typical metrics include the number of losses of separation, the number of required con-
flict resolution maneuvers, and other measures of operational efficiency such as arrival delay and flight path
deviation.
In a fast-time, Monte Carlo simulation, a great number of operations can be simulated, yielding high-
quality statistical data about the concept of interest. However, the goodness of the results are limited by
the quality of the agent behavior model. In many simulations, this is a procedure-based model which does
not capture the nuances of actual human behavior. Additionally, even in a Monte Carlo simulation, the
number of runs required to estimate the probability of rare events can be difficult to achieve. Computer
simulation suffers from the same generalization problem as HITL experiments: a simulation inherently
simulates a specific concept, procedure, and technology, and it can be difficult to generalize the results to
broader research questions.
5.4 Discussion
The general approach of formulating function allocation as an optimization problem is complicated on two
fronts. Whereas many other traditional engineering problems may be simplified to a finite number of con-
tinuous and discrete variables, it is much more complicated to enumerate a comprehensive set of separation
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assurance functions, agents, and architectures. A simplified matrix of assignment between functions and
agents misses many of the practical details of operational implementation in the real world, details which
have great significance to the evaluation of alternative architectures. Thus there is a serious problem in
simply describing architectures at a meaningful level of detail, and doing so for enough of them in order to
cover the breadth of the trade space in any one research study.
Second, there are also basic problems in the evaluation of architectures against relevant metrics. There
are no simple physics-based or empirical equations that can be used to roughly evaluate the overall opera-
tional properties of a system of such scale and complexity as the global air traffic management system. This
is especially true for revolutionary architectures, for which there may be no analogous systems in the real
world from which to extrapolate. Many relevant factors depend on details that are notoriously difficult to
model such as human operator behavior, the interactions between large regulatory and operational organi-
zations, national economics and air traffic demand, and many others. The intractable problems of modeling
complex systems-of-systems are not new in the engineering world, but are exacerbated by the scale of the
problems in air traffic management.
It is generally recognized that in the middle of the human-automation axis lies a discontinuity between
the capability of an automation system and the ability of the human operator to intervene during failures
and off-nominal conditions. This is true for human-automation systems in general and also for separation
assurance systems in particular. The discontinuity refers to the case where an automation system is sophis-
ticated enough to take over some functions during normal operations, but is not robust enough to “never
fail.” During these failures or other circumstances where a human is required to intervene, we may have a
deficiency in the human’s ability to do so. For instance, if the primary function was being handled by the
automation and the human was paying attention to other things, then the human may no longer be properly
engaged to immediately handle the emergent situation. Additionally, human operators over time lose the
skills necessary to perform a function if they don’t practice it regularly, further exacerbating the problem.
6 Conclusion
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the body of work reviewed in this report. First, a great deal
of work has demonstrated the basic technical feasibility of automated separation assurance algorithms in
both airborne and ground-based applications. However, much work remains to develop these pathfinder
projects into mature tools for real world deployment. In particular, CD&R algorithms should incorporate
more sources of information into the optimization process for more sophisticated and robust inference and
decision making.
Additionally, almost every advanced separation assurance algorithm and concept of operation requires
some form of communications and surveillance infrastructure beyond what is available today, including
ADS-B and controller-pilot data link. These technologies continue to be the foundation for future separation
assurance systems and the rest of the ATM system. A sustainable path for their full deployment is needed to
realize any of the future concepts discussed in this report.
There is no clear winner in the air vs. ground debate, and the authors propose that elements of both
approaches will be needed in the future. Research has shown the merits of both ground-based and airborne
separation approaches in different circumstances. We can conceive of an integrated air-ground system with
system-wide optimization, safety assurance, and conformance monitoring provided by the ground, accom-
modating user-preferred routes and other trajectory optimization requests generated by the air. With the
emergence of UAS of all types within the airspace system, we see the merits of airborne self separation as a
complement or backup to ground-based separation. Many of these notions have been discussed among the
technical community for decades.
The problems of the human-automation axis in the separation assurance domain mirror those found else-
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where in aviation and other transportation disciplines [72]. In particular, there is a significant gap between
the small advances possible by the introduction of decision support tools to aid the pilot and controller vs.
the leap to fully automated separation assurance. In this intermediate area lie a set of critically important
research challenges in the design of human-automation teams with shared responsibility for safety critical
functions such as separation assurance.
Finally, the basic tools for the design and analysis of separation assurance systems are still in their
infancy. Computer-based and human-in-the-loop simulations each address part of the problem, as do the
heuristic approaches to function allocation from the human factors discipline. However, we are still lim-
ited in our ability to understand the technical implications of separation assurance design choices from the
perspective of complexity science. Where there is greater maturity in the technical evaluation of a given
separation assurance algorithm or concept, the softer issues of economics and policy are very difficult to
study in an analytical way. The ability to make stronger recommendations for separation assurance function
allocation will improve as advances are made in the tools and methodology of the research in these areas.
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